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INTRODUCTION
On 28 September 2009, the Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa (‘the
SCA’) delivered a judgment in Cuninghame v First Ready Development 249
[2010] 1 All SA 473 (SCA) regarding a section 21 company, the principal
business of which was the management of a commercial hotel. The
judgment, it is submitted, will have far reaching practical consequences for a
substantial number of registered section 21 companies which undertake
commercial objects for ‘group or communal interests’ as provided for under
s 21(1)(b) of the CompaniesAct 61 of 1973 (‘the 1973 CompaniesAct’).
The purpose of this case note is to analyse the judgment critically, with
particular reference to whether a non-proﬁt company, in the form of a
section 21 company, can lawfully undertake a business with a view to
advance a ‘group or communal interest’ unrelated to the promotion of
religion, arts, sciences, education, charity, recreation or any other cultural or
social interests (ie ‘public beneﬁt/charitable purposes’).
In justifying the conclusion that such a section 21 company cannot
lawfully undertake any commercial or trading activities unrelated to public
beneﬁt/charitable purposes, the court, per Brand JA (with whom Maya and
Mhlantla JJA, Hurt and Tshiqi AJJA concurred), concluded as follows in para
17:
‘It is clear from the section that such an association must be one not for gain and
that its main object must be a charitable, benevolent or philanthropic one. An
association whose main object is a purely commercial one or one intended to
achieve a purely commercial purpose and to make a proﬁt is not in compliance
with s 21(1)(b) of the Companies Act. The main object of [the respondent] . . .
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is clearly one which is intended to achieve a purely commercial purpose,
namely, the operation and administration of furnished hotel apartments and the
management and operation of conference, wellness and restaurant facilities.
This is not an object which is provided for in s 21(1)(b) of the CompaniesAct.’
The court went on to state in para 19 that:
‘[I]f the expression ‘‘group interests’’ in s 21(1)(b) is to be construed without any
limitation, the preceding references in the section to religion, arts, sciences and
so forth could hardly have any meaning. . . . The point is that if the reference to
‘‘group interest’’ is to be afforded the wide meaning contended for by the
respondent it will for all intents and purposes render s 21(1)(b) nugatory.’
The court ultimately concluded that because of its association with the
words ‘religion, arts, sciences, education, charity, recreation, or any other
social or cultural activity’, the phrase ‘communal or group interests’ should be
interpreted in accordance with the eiusdem generis doctrine so as to restrict
its meaning to ‘charitable, benevolent, cultural or social activities, as opposed
to commercial enterprises’ (ibid).
It is submitted that the court should have appreciated that in order to
determine whether the main object of the association was for proﬁt or not,
the question to be answered was whether the association was formed for the
purpose of carrying on a business the object of which was the acquisition of gain by
individual members (my emphasis: see, among others, In Padstow Total Loss and
Collision Assurance Association (1882) 20 Ch D 137 at 147). In other words, the
question should not only be whether an association was formed for the
purpose of carrying on business, but should also include whether the object
was the acquisition of gain by individual members.
I am aware of the concession made by the court that ‘that there is nothing
in s 21 which prohibits an association not for gain from making a proﬁt. On
the contrary, s 21(1)(c) speciﬁcally provides that an association is obliged to
apply its proﬁts (if any) to promote its main object’ (para 19). This
concession, however, is very limited in its application as the court sought to
restrict the main object for which the proﬁt may be used to the promotion of
‘charitable, benevolent, cultural or social activities . . .’ (ibid). In other words,
the proﬁt referred to in s 21(1)(c) may only be pursued by associations or
organisations that promote benevolent, cultural or social activities, thus
unduly restricting the meaning of ‘communal or group interests’ in s 21(1)(b).
The court tried to justify this conclusion by reference to the heading of
s 21, which refers to section 21 companies as being ‘associations not for gain’
(paras 20–2). In this regard, the court referred to legal authorities (among
them Mitchell’s Plain Town Centre Merchants’Association v McCleod 1996 (4) SA
159 (A) at 169–70, South African Flour Millers’ Mutual Association v Rutowitz
Flour Mills Ltd 1938 CPD 199, and the English case of Re Arthur Average
Association for British, Foreign and Colonial Ships, Ex parte Hargrove & Co (1987)
10 Ch App 542 at 545) which effectively interpreted ‘gain’ as being
‘tantamount to a commercial enterprise, as distinguished from a charitable,
benevolent, humanitarian . . . or sporting organisation, for instance’.
Although this interpretation is within the context of a section requiring
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registration of a proﬁt-making association with more than a prescribed
number of proprietors (ie s 30(1)), such a section makes no reference to
group or communal interest in the alternative, as s 21(1)(b) does. It is within
this context that the relevance of this comparison is questionable. The court
justiﬁes its conclusion by asserting that it is not possible that the legislature
could have intended to ascribe a ‘different meaning to exactly the same
expression within the compass of a few sections in the sameAct . . .’(para 23).
This reasoning appears to be inventive, is unsupported by any of the statutory
interpretation principles, and is conveniently optimistic. (A well known
statutory interpretation principle is that ‘in construing words of a statute it
must be assumed that the legislature used them in their popular sense . . .
unless the context or the subject-matter clearly shows that they were intended to be used
in a different sense’ (emphasis supplied). See E A Kellaway Principles of Legal
Interpretation: Statutes, Contracts & Wills (1995) at 71; Beedle & Co v Bowley
(1895) 12 SC 401 at 402 and Van Coller v Commissioner of Child Welfare, Vrede
1956 (4) SA 807 (O) at 810.) In the context of ss 30 and 31, the word ‘gain’ is
used in the context of the requirement to register a commercial enterprise
with more than 20 proprietors, whereas in s 21 the word ‘gain’ was used in
the context of the association not for gain of the members. (This is conﬁrmed
by the court in para 19 and also by the provisions of s 21(1)(c) and s 21(2)(a).)
Furthermore, within the context of a non-proﬁt company, even though the
company’s main object may seem to be concerned with the acquisition of
gain in the same way as a proﬁt company’s is, if the gain so acquired is not
distributed as dividends to the members but is used for some communal or
group interest, such a company should still be capable of being registered as a
section 21 company even though the main object is unrelated to philan-
thropic, benevolent, cultural, or social interests. For example, a section 21
company may have as its main object the operation and management of a
hotel. This main object or principal business will almost invariably be
undertaken at a proﬁt. However, if the members of such a company are all
owners of sectional title units which make up hotel rooms of the hotel the
company is operating, the company would still qualify as a non-proﬁt one if
the owners/members of the company get no more than reasonable remuner-
ation for services rendered — ie making their units available and suitable for
use by hotel customers. Any additional proﬁt made may then be used by the
company to enable it effectively to undertake its principal business for the
purposes of communal or group interests, the group or community being
owners of the sectional title units who are also members of the company.
The court further relied on the recommendation of the Commission of
Inquiry into the Companies Act (RP 45/1970 of 15 April 1970) which
concluded in para 25.04(e) that ‘the case of associations intending to carry on
business for gain which yet wish to comply with the conditions of s21 is . . .
so limited that it may be ignored’ (para 24).Although this statement may have
been true in 1970, the same cannot be said today: I argue elsewhere in this
note that a substantial number of section 21 companies registered on the
Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Ofﬁce’s (‘CIPRO’s’)
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database are not the classic benevolent, charitable or social organisations, but
do carry on business to promote or support some other group or communal
interest. As mentioned above, a common (and legitimate) example of a
communal or group interest that may be pursued within this context is that of
sectional title unit owners, who may prefer, for whatever reason, to use a
section 21 company, which may beneﬁt them only to the extent of
remunerating them for services rendered in connection with the said
sectional title units.
The reasoning of the court in para 25 to the effect that ‘the pursuit of
group interest would require a group with common interest’ is perhaps the
court’s strongest argument for distinguishing the facts on the basis that in the
case in point, the members of the group for which the association was formed
had divergent interests. However, to conclude that the members’ interests
have to be common for the purposes of a legitimate group interest is not the
same as concluding that ‘communal or group interests’will have no meaning
if divorced from benevolent, charitable or social activities. In the example
provided above, if the group or communal interests advanced extend beyond
those of sectional title owners and include those of ordinary property
investors, then clearly the group for which the association was formed would
have divergent interests in the manner explained by the court. Sectional title
owners as a group may not be concerned with benevolent, philanthropic or
benevolent objects, but they may still constitute a legitimate group for whose
interests the company may be formed in terms of s 21(1)(b). It is the
conclusion of the court that a group interest must be for charitable or
benevolent purposes which, I would argue, is misguided.
It is this conclusion of the court which is bound to have grave ramiﬁca-
tions for the non-proﬁt sector in South Africa and for the economy of the
country. This is because, according to a recent survey of all section 21
companies on CIPRO’s database, of the 22 645 registered section 21
companies, a signiﬁcant number of between 8000 and 10 000 clearly fell
outside of the category of companies undertaking what the court referred to
as ‘charitable, benevolent, cultural or social activities’ (this information has
been extracted from a document entitled ‘Copy of total section 21 entities
per code per year from 1800–2009’ obtainable from CIPRO: see http://
www.cipro.co.za//about_us/Web_Statistics_Version7.pdf). These companies will
thus be operating illegally, if this judgment is to stand in its current form.
In dismissing the argument by the respondent that the court’s judgment
would have serious consequences for a number of associations with purely
commercial objects (in the sense explained above) incorporated under s 21,
the court said in para 33: ‘[W]e can hardly avoid what we consider to be the
proper meaning of a statutory provision because it will cause considerable
inconvenience to a number of people. If that were true, it is something to be
taken up with the legislature.’
There is no judgment to my knowledge that has ever been delivered in
South Africa which provided meaning to ‘communal or group interests’ in
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s 21(1)(b).As such, CIPRO, as a regulatory agency, was entitled to accord the
phrase the literal meaning, and not to restrict it by the eiusdem generis
method of interpretation, as the court did in this case, so limiting its meaning
to a category of benevolent, charitable and social activities. One can point
out that in an earlier Supreme Court ofAppeal decision in Grobbelaar v Van de
Vyver 1954 (1) SA 248 (A), the court made it clear that the eiusdem generis
doctrine ‘must not be allowed to substitute an artiﬁcial intention for what
was clearly the real one’ (at 255A).
In relation to the distinction the court drew between section 21 companies
and commercial enterprises (in para 19), the court clearly failed to appreciate
the distinction between a commercial enterprise (such as a private or public
company or a close corporation or a partnership) and a section 21 company
which undertakes commercial activities or trading for the purpose of
promoting its non-proﬁt purposes in advancing group or communal inter-
ests. The latter practice is common among non-proﬁt organisations —
particularly section 21 companies — and it is erroneous to conclude that such
a practice is prohibited by the language of s 21(1)(b) of the 1973 Companies
Act. Even though the court conceded that ‘there is nothing in s21 which
prohibits an association not for gain from making a proﬁt’ (para 19), its
interpretation of ‘group interests’ as being synonymous with benevolent,
charitable and social activities nevertheless leaves no scope for any type of
section 21 company to be capable of making such proﬁt, as purely
benevolent, charitable and social organisations rely on donations or public
funding and do not, as a norm, engage in commercial or trading activities to
promote their objects. The undertaking of trading or commercial activities
would ordinarily be undertaken by associations promoting communal or
group interests unrelated to benevolent, charitable or social objects, such as
property owners’ associations referred to above. It is clear that in pursuing a
main object or principal business which is exclusively benevolent, philan-
thropic, social or cultural in nature, the likelihood of any commercial trading
is severely restricted.
Having outlined the decision of the court above, the rest of this note
considers four speciﬁc issues that require further analysis: (1) whether
‘communal’ or ‘group’ interests are restricted to religion, arts, sciences,
education, charity, recreation or other cultural or social objects; (2) whether a
section 21 company is precluded from undertaking or being concerned with
any commercial or proﬁt making activities; (3) how the comparable
provisions of the recently promulgated Companies Act 71 of 2008 deal with
non-proﬁt companies; and (4) the effect of a liquidation order on unlawful
non-proﬁt companies.
WHETHER ‘COMMUNAL’ OR ‘GROUP’ INTERESTS ARE
RESTRICTED TO RELIGION, ARTS, SCIENCES, EDUCATION,
CHARITY, RECREATION OR OTHER CULTURAL OR SOCIAL
OBJECTS
The court concluded that the phrase ‘communal or group interests’ in
s 21(1)(b) ‘must therefore be construed eiusdem generis with that which
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comes before it’ (para 19). The words which precede ‘communal or group
interests’ are ‘religion, arts, sciences, education, charity, recreation, or any
other cultural or social activity’. These latter words clearly envisage a category of
benevolent, educational, charitable, cultural and social activities or objects.
The view of the court as reﬂected above is to the effect that the promotion
of group or communal interests should be limited to what, in effect, are
benevolent, educational, charitable, cultural and social activities or objects.
Indeed, the court said this in so many words when it concluded by saying ‘if
the expression ‘‘group interests’’ in s 21(1)(b) is to be construed without any
limitation, the preceding references in the section to religion, arts, sciences
and so forth could hardly have any meaning’ (ibid). This restricted interpreta-
tion of the provisions of s 21(1)(b) by the court was based on the application
of the doctrine of statutory construction known as the eiusdem generis
doctrine, which in essence requires that general words such as ‘all other
property, ‘communal or group interests’ should sometimes be used in a more
restricted sense than they would bear if construed in isolation. In the words of
Professor R H Christie (The Law of Contract in South Africa 4 ed (2001) 252),
when this doctrine is employed, ‘the meaning of the general words [is]
known from the company they keep’.
It is questionable whether the words ‘group’ or ‘communal’ interests
should be restricted to a varied list of words such as ‘religion,’ ‘arts,’ ‘sciences,’
‘education,’ ‘charity,’ ‘recreation’ or any ‘other cultural or social object’,
particularly as it is apparent that the latter list consists of words which
contemplate the undertaking of what may generally be referred to as
‘charitable, benevolent or philanthropic’ objects, the pursuance of which is
almost invariably dependent on donations or some form of public funding. It
could not possibly have been the intention of the legislature that ‘communal
or group interests’ should be restricted to charitable, benevolent or philan-
thropic objects. The organisation or enterprise’s main object, which is
tantamount to its ‘principal business’ invariably guides the commercial
activities that the organisation or the enterprise engages itself in (Tshepo
Mongalo Corporate Law & Corporate Governance: A Global Picture of Business
Undertakings in South Africa (2003) 238) and, as evidenced by the database of
non-proﬁt companies registered with CIPRO, not all section 21 companies
incorporated in South Africa are dependant on donations or public funding.
In fact, a substantial number of section 21 companies registered with CIPRO
have, as their principal business, objects which are unrelated to charitable,
benevolent, cultural or related ambits. These associations, in pursuit of their
principal business, engage in some commercial enterprise to raise income to
promote their objects of promoting group or communal interests, and do not
rely solely or primarily on donations in the same way as charitable entities do
(as is indicated by the data made available by CIPRO). Moreover, as has
already been indicated, in the case of Grobbelaar v Van de Vyver (supra at
255A), the court concluded that the eiusdem generis doctrine ‘must not be
allowed to substitute an artiﬁcial intention for what was clearly the real one’.
This being the case, the conclusion that ‘communal or group interests’ should
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be limited to charitable, benevolent or philanthropic objects is untenable.
Moreover, an assessment of a number of section 21 companies undertaken by
the author in August 2009 revealed that the common examples of principal
business usually undertaken by these companies in the promotion of
communal or group interests include:
(a) Property management services, like home owners associations;
(b) Letting/selling services for property owners;
(c) Electricity management services on behalf of residents in security
complexes;
(d) Management of sectional title properties on behalf of owners;
(e) Provision of security services on behalf of organised communities;
(f) Marketing of local business, accommodation establishments and tour-
ism products to visitors and potential visitors to a designated area for the
common interest of the relevant business owners, who provide a variety
of tourism related products and services;
(g) Management, operation, administration, marketing and leasing of
furnished hotel apartments, conference and restaurant facilities for
groups of apartment and sectional title owners.
Most, if not all, of the above main objects will invariably be undertaken at
a proﬁt and will thus not be automatically excluded from qualifying as
communal or group interest activities. To conclude, as the court did, that
even shareholders are a group with common interests, is to lose sight of the
fact that with shareholders, the interest is always that the proﬁts derived from
the company should be distributed among them. Such an interest does not,
and cannot, legally, be associated with a group for which a section 21
company is formed.
WHETHER A SECTION 21 COMPANY IS PRECLUDED FROM
UNDERTAKING OR BEING CONCERNED WITH ANY
COMMERCIAL OR PROFIT-MAKING ACTIVITIES
The second issue which is addressed in this note concerns whether a section
21 company is precluded from undertaking commercial or proﬁt-making
activities. This is the issue which the court seems, with respect, to have
misunderstood completely. In this regard, the court appears to be making a
sweeping generalisation by saying that a section 21 company undertaking a
commercial object is a commercial enterprise (see para 19).
Section 21 companies are otherwise known as ‘associations not for gain’.
This expression is often misinterpreted to mean that these entities cannot
have, as their main object, an entrepreneurial venture. This is wrong. The
real meaning of the expression is that the entities are precluded from being
used for the sole beneﬁt of, or for proﬁting, the members or incorporators in
the sense of entitling these members or incorporators to a share in the proﬁts
or distributions in the same way as shareholders of a company or partners in a
partnership are entitled to a share in the proﬁts or distributions. This seems to
be the meaning ascribed by the drafters of the new Companies Act 71 of
NOTES 201
2008, as reﬂected in Schedule 1 to thatAct. Therefore, given the substantially
similar language contained in item 1(1)(a)(ii) of Schedule 1 to the Act, the
court’s conclusion that the language of the newAct ‘must . . . be understood
to indicate a different intent on the part of the legislature’ is without any
justiﬁcation.
In the March 2000 a Consultation Document of the UK’s Company Law
Review Steering Group (entitled ‘Modern company law for a competitive
economy: Developing the framework’ (March 2000) vol 5) the following
was stated with regard to not-for-proﬁt organisations (NFPOs): ‘NFPOs
include charities, members’ sports and social clubs, campaigning organisa-
tions and even small property management companies. Many of these
organisations make a signiﬁcant contribution to the UK economy, and have
become increasingly important providers of public services.’ (Ibid para 9.7 p
292.) The Steering Group made the following further observation: ‘The only
special treatment in company law which applies generally to NFPOs (i.e. not
just charities [emphasis supplied]) is the privilege of not using the word
‘‘limited’’ in the name of the company, in accordance with the rules now set
out in section 30 [of the UK Companies Act, 1985]. This requires that the
company’s objects involve the promotion of commerce, art, science,
education, religion, charity or a profession and that any profits must be applied in
furtherance of the company’s objects rather than distributed to members.’ (Ibid para
9.11 p 293, emphasis supplied.)
It must be emphasised that although the UK Companies Act, 1985, did
not provide for the exact equivalent of the section 21 companies recognised
under the South African 1973 Companies Act, the law regulating incorpo-
rated non-proﬁt organisations in the UK was similar to the law in South
Africa, primarily because section 21 companies are a sub-species of compa-
nies limited by guarantee, and such companies were recognised under the
UK CompaniesAct, 1985 to which the UK Company Law Review Steering
Group refers in the quotations above.
A classic example of a company limited by guarantee in SouthAfrica is the
South African Music Rights Organisation (SAMRO). In brief, SAMRO is a
non-proﬁt organisation which does not receive any donations or public
funding but collects licence fees from users of music and distributes royalties
to its members (composers, authors and publishers) after deducting its
administrative costs.
It is therefore apparent that incorporated non-proﬁt organisations — and
indeed all types of non-proﬁt organisations — such as the section 21
company, are not precluded from having, as their main object, the undertak-
ing of a commercial venture, so long as the proﬁts so derived are applied in
furtherance of the organisation’s objects rather than distributed to members.
The upshot is that any allegation that such entities are precluded from having
the undertaking of commercial ventures as their main objects must be
rejected. This is underscored by the court’s conclusion that even though s 21
companies may be able to make proﬁt, their main objects should nevertheless
be restricted to benevolent, charitable, cultural or social activities, which
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clearly cannot constitute a closed list of main objects with which s 21
companies may concern themselves, as indicated by the data obtained from
CIPRO. Moreover, it has been shown that a large number of s 21 companies
which undertake commercial or trading activities do not fall squarely under
the main objects as restricted by the court.
HOW DO THE COMPARABLE PROVISIONS OF THE
RECENTLY PROMULGATED COMPANIES ACT 71 OF 2008
DEAL WITH NON-PROFIT COMPANIES?
The new Companies Act 71 of 2008, which was signed into law by the
President on 8 April 2009, makes it abundantly clear that non-proﬁt
companies can undertake commercial activities or some form of trading (see
item 1(2)(b)(ii) of Schedule 1 to the new CompaniesAct).
Following the Corporate Law Reform process which was ofﬁcially
launched in 2003, the Department of Trade & Industry in SouthAfrica made
it clear that the continued utility of a section 21 company could not be
gainsaid (para 2.24 p 20 of the ‘Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform’
published in GN 1183, GG 26493 of 23 June 2004). That is why the
resulting legislation re-enacted, although with some re-phrasing, the provi-
sions of section 21 under Schedule 1 to the new Act as follows (all the
italicised portions are for emphasis):
‘1 Objects and policies
(1) The Memorandum of Incorporation of a non-proﬁt company must —
(a) set out at least one object of the company, and each such object must be
either —
(i) a public beneﬁt object; or
(ii) an object relating to one or more cultural or social activities, or communal or
group interests; and
(b) be consistent with the principles set out in sub-items (2) to (9).’
The most important of the sub-items contained in the Schedule are to the
effect that:
‘(2)Anon-proﬁt company —
(a) must apply all of its assets and income, however derived, to advance its stated
objects, as set out in its Memorandum of Incorporation; and
(b) subject to paragraph (a), may —
(i) acquire and hold securities issued by a profit company; or
(ii) directly or indirectly, alone or with any other person, carry on any business,
trade or undertaking consistent with or ancillary to its stated objects.
(3) Anon-proﬁt company must not, directly or indirectly, pay any portion of
its income or transfer any of its assets, regardless [of however] the income or
asset was derived to any person who is or was an incorporator of the company,
or who is a member or director, or person appointing a director, of the
company, except —
(a) as reasonable —
(i) remuneration for goods delivered or services rendered to, or at the
direction of, the company; or
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(ii) payment of, or reimbursement for, expenses incurred to advance a
stated object of the company;
(b) as a payment of an amount due and payable by the company in terms of a
bona ﬁde agreement between the company and that person or another;
(c) as a payment in respect of any rights of that person, to the extent that such
rights are administered by the company in order to advance a stated object
of the company; or
(d) in respect of any legal obligation binding on the company.
(4) Despite any provision in any law or agreement to the contrary, upon the
winding-up or dissolution of a non-proﬁt company —
(a) no past or present member or director of that company, or person
appointing a director of that company, is entitled to any part of the net
value of the company after its obligations and liabilities have been satisﬁed;
and
(b) the entire net value of the company must be distributed to one or more
non-proﬁt companies, external non-proﬁt companies carrying on activi-
ties within the Republic, voluntary associations or non-proﬁt trusts —
(i) having objects similar to its main object; and
(ii) as determined —
(aa) in terms of the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation;
(bb) by its members, if any, or its directors, at or immediately before
the time of its dissolution; or
(cc) by the court, if the Memorandum of Incorporation, or the
members or directors fail to make such a determination.
4 Members
(1) A non-proﬁt company is not required to have members, but its
Memorandum of Incorporation may provide for it to do so. . . .’
It is clear from the above provisions of Schedule 1 to the new Companies
Act that, save that the non-proﬁt company advances its main object as
reﬂected in its Memorandum of Incorporation, it is not prohibited from
‘directly or indirectly carrying on any business, trade or undertaking which is
consistent with or ancillary to its main objects’.
In brief, the newAct advances the following four important points:
(a) It clearly distinguishes the promotion of the public beneﬁt object from
the objects related to cultural or social, communal or group interests.
(b) It clearly allows a non-proﬁt company to engage in commercial
activities by engaging into two primary proﬁt making ventures as
follows:
(i) investing in a proﬁt company by acquiring securities of such
companies; and
(ii) directly or indirectly carrying on any business, trade or undertak-
ing consistent or ancillary to its main objects.
(c) It generally prohibits direct or indirect payment of any portion of its
income or transfer of any of its assets to any person who is or was an
incorporator of the company, or who is a member or director, or person
appointing a director, of the company, unless such payment constitutes:
(i) reasonable remuneration for goods delivered or services rendered
to, or at the direction of, the company; or reasonable payment of,
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or reimbursement for, expenses incurred to advance a stated object
of the company;
(ii) payment of an amount due and payable by the company in terms
of a bona ﬁde agreement between the company and that person or
another;
(iii) payment in respect of any rights of that person, to the extent that
such rights are administered by the company in order to advance a
stated object of the company.
(d) It clearly indicates that the non-proﬁt object of a company pursuing a
‘group or communal interest’ lies in the fact that the company uses its
income or revenue solely for advancing such group or communal
interests and does not distribute the income or revenue so derived to the
members of the group in the same manner as a proﬁt company does.
It is therefore clear that the intention of the legislature is to enable
non-proﬁt companies to engage in commercial or proﬁt-making activities so
long as the proﬁts derived therefrom were used to advance the company’s
objects, including the promotion of communal or group interests which do
not have to be of a charitable, benevolent, or philanthropic nature as
suggested by the court .
THE EFFECT OF THE LIQUIDATION ORDER ON UNLAWFUL
NON PROFIT COMPANIES
A separate issue which I raise for the sake of completeness relates to the
ﬁnding of the court that ‘the respondent [company] stands to be liquidated
in the ordinary course’ (para 35). This conclusion is startling because
the court expressly refers to the ‘liquidation of the company’ even though
from the judgment it is clear that the court was questioning the respondent’s
status as a s 21 company. Having concluded that the respondent’s main object
was unlawful and can thus not lawfully fall within the ambit of s 21, the next
question which begs an answer is what, according to the court, is the status of
the respondent? Does the decision of the court render the respondent to be a
mere association constituted at common law, or does it make the respondent
a commercial enterprise and, if so, what type of a commercial enterprise?Was
it rendered to be a partnership, or a private company or a public company?
These questions are important because they should have directed the court as
to whether the liquidation order would have been an appropriate order in
the circumstances. In terms of s 21(2)(b) of the 1973 Companies Act: ‘Upon
its winding-up, deregistration or dissolution the assets of the association
remaining after the satisfaction of all its liabilities shall be given or transferred
to some other association or institution or associations or institutions having
objects similar to its main object, to be determined by the members of the
association at or before the time of its dissolution or, failing such determina-
tion, by the Court.’ This would be the effect of the liquidation order upon a
s 21 company. However, this does not seem to be what the court intended
when it concluded that the company stood to be liquidated ‘in the ordinary
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course’. The reason why I say this is because to conclude that the respondent
had to be liquidated pursuant to s 21(2)(b) would ﬂy in the face of the ﬁnding
of the court that the main object of the company was a purely commercial
one and was thus prohibited by s 21(1)(b).What, then, was intended by the
court when it concluded that the respondent stood to be liquidated ‘in the
ordinary course’? Does this mean that even though the respondent was not a
s 21 company, it nevertheless remained a company, and this would justify a
liquidation order? If the decision of the court was to render the respondent
not to be a company, but some form of an association, then a liquidation
order would be inappropriate.
In terms of s 2 of the InsolvencyAct 24 of 1936 a ‘debtor’means ‘a person
or a partnership or the estate of a person or partnership which is a debtor in
the usual sense of the word, except a body corporate or a company or other
association of persons which may be placed in liquidation under the law
relating to Companies’. This deﬁnition makes it abundantly clear that the
Insolvency Act excludes a company or a body corporate from the deﬁnition.
If the respondent was not a company but an association of persons
constituted as a partnership, it was not capable of being ‘liquidated in the
ordinary course’. In this regard, the court reached an untenable conclusion.
If the respondent was not a genuine s 21 company, as the court concluded,
it could at most be an association of people having, as its object, the
acquisition of gain as contemplated in s 30(1). Such an association would be
illegal and, thus, not be capable of operating with such an object if it had
members in excess of twenty unless it was registered in terms of the
CompaniesAct as contemplated in s30(1) of theAct.
In Padstow Total Loss and Collision Assurance Association (supra), Jessel MR
said (at 143), in reference to an association which the respondent would seem
to be in the case under discussion:
‘[A]ssuming the association to be an unlawful one, could the Court properly
make the winding-up order? It appears to me to have been decided that it could
not, and it seems to me on principle that it could not. . . . It seems to me,
therefore, that, both on authority and principle, such an association cannot be
wound up.’
In the same judgment Brett LJ, commenting in relation to an association
which did not comply with statutory obligations and was thus unlawful,
concluded that ‘there never existed at any time any company, association, or
partnership of which the law could properly take cognizance and with regard
to which the Court could properly make a winding-up order’ (at 148).At the
same time, Lindley LJ commented that since the association could not be
recognised in law, ‘I am of opinion that this winding-up order ought never to
have been made, and ought to be discharged’ (at 150) (see also the case of In re
South Wales Atlantic Steamship Company 2 Ch D 763 where the court was
strongly inclined to the opinion that there could not be a winding-up order
where an association was proved to be not in existence for failure to comply
with the law).
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With reference to the above decisions, the court in Opperman NO &
another v Taylor’s All Africa Services & another 1958 (4) SA 696 (C) held that the
court will not grant a winding up order or any other order of a similar nature
in respect of an illegal organisation.
It goes without saying that the court was clearly misguided in granting a
liquidation order in respect of what it found to be an unlawful association.
CONCLUSION
This unfortunate decision of the Supreme Court ofAppeal will, with respect,
have serious and potentially disastrous consequences for a substantial number
of registered section 21 companies which are not charitable, benevolent or
philanthropic organisations, as the judgment effectively declares such organi-
sations to be unlawful. The ripple effect of the judgment may also lead to
economic ruin for such organisations. Unless this judgment is overturned
soon, it may also lead to the disruptive implementation of the new
Companies Act, as the comparable provisions in Schedule 1 of the Act may
be subjected to an interpretation similar to the one articulated by the court in
this matter.
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